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Abstract
A recent large-scale study of people’s forecasting ability has shown that
there is a small group of superforecasters, whose forecasts are signiﬁcantly
more accurate than the forecasts of an average person. Since forecasting
is important in many application areas, researchers have studied what
exactly the supreforecasters do diﬀerently – and how we can learn from
them, so that we will be able to forecast better. One empirical fact that
came from this study is that, in contrast to most people, superforecasters
make much smaller adjustements to their probability estimates. On average, their average probability change is 3.5%. In this paper, we provide a
possible theoretical explanation for this empirical value.

1

Formulation of the Problem

Who are superforecaters. People make forecasts all the time.
• We make a forecasts when we change a job – we forecast that that the
new job will last for a signiﬁcant amount of time.
• We make a forecast when we buy a house – this real estate prices in this
area do not drop, making us lose most of our investment, etc.
Some people are better in making forecasts, some are worse. To analyze
people’s ability to make predictions, Dr. Philip E. Tetlock ran a long-term experiment in which many people tried to predict events (mostly outside their
usual are of expertise), e.g.:
• the outcome of an election in a faraway country, or
1

• future price of oil.
People were asked to provide, for each forecast, the probability to which they
believe in their answer. After that, the researchers compared these probabilities
with the actual frequencies of correct forecasts.
Somewhat surprisingly, it turned out that:
• while for most forecasters, such prediction are not more successful than
random guesses,
• there is a small group of participants whose forecasts were consistently
signiﬁcantly more accurate than a random guess.
Tetlock called such people superforecaters; see [3] and references therein.
Superforecasters Change Their Estimates on Average by 3.5%. In
many application areas, it is important to make good forecasts. It is therefore
desirable to analyze how superforecaster do it, what do they do diﬀerently, so
that we can all learn from them and become better forecasters.
One such diﬀerence is related to how people change their probabilities when
presented with new information. When a new information appears:
• most people make a signiﬁcant change in their probabilities, while
• for superforecasters, most changes are small: the average change is 3.5%.
How can we explain this empirical fact? The value 3.5% is not just an
accidental average: according to [3], it appears consistently when we analyze a
group of superforecasters.
This consistency is an indication that there should be a theoretical explanation for this empirical phenomenon.
What we do in this paper. In this paper, we provide a possible explanation
for this phenomenon.
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Possible Explanation

Main idea. The main idea behind our explanation is the well-known seven
plus minus two law [1, 2], according to which people divide everything into 7 ± 2
groups: on average, into 7 groups.
How this idea applies to probabilities. In particular, when we gauge probabilities, then, instead of considering all possible values from the interval [0, 1],
we divide these values into, on average, 7 subintervals.
In the ﬁrst approximation, it is reasonable to assume that these subintervals
have equal length, i.e., that we consider intervals
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As a natural representation of each interval we can take its midpoint. So we
end up with the following seven typical probability values:
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What happens when a normal forecaster changes his/her probabilities. When a normal forecaster changes the probabilities, they switch from one
of these probabilities to the previous or next one, with an average change of
1
about ≈ 14%.
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What happens when a superforecaster changes his/her probabilities.
According to [3], superforecasters do not stay in the above ﬁrst-approximation
level of describing probabilities, they use, so to say, second-order detailing.
Based on the general seven plus minus two law, it is reasonable to assume
that they have, on average, seven sub-levels connecting every two neighboring
probability levels:
0 − 1 − 2 − 3 − 4 − 5 − 6 − 7.
Here:
• 0 is the sub-level corresponding to the ﬁrst probability level, and
• 7 is the sub-level corresponding to the second probability level.
Sub-levels 0, 1, 2, and 3 are closest to the ﬁrst probability level, while sub-levels
4, 5, 6, and 7 are closer to the second probability level.
So:
• if we start at the ﬁrst probability level (which corresponds to sub-level 0),
• then we ﬁrst move to sub-level 1 – which still corresponds to the same
probability level.
• Then, we move to sub-level 2 – which still corresponds to the original
probability level.
• Only when we make 4 such steps and reach sub-level 4, then we switch to
the next probability level.
This explains the 3.5% phenomenon. As we have mentioned earlier, two
neighboring probability levels diﬀerent by ≈ 14%.
We have shown that to switch from one probability level to the next one,
we need to preform four updating steps. Thus, on average, each updating step
14%
, which is exactly 3.5%.
changes the probability by a value of
4
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